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Torts and Workmen's Compensation
TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
Several important torts decisions were handed down during
the past term of the Supreme Court. Only three of the cases
rested principally upon the resolution of a fact dispute.1
NEGLIGENCE
Contractor's Duty to Third Persons
Extended discussion here of the important decision, Marine
Insurance Co. v. Strecker,2 is not necessary, since this case is
the subject of an excellent note in an earlier issue of the Review.3
It is sufficient to observe that the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a building contractor remains liable to third persons for his
negligence in the erection of a structure even after the struc-
ture has been accepted by his principal, the owner. Plaintiff,
a tenant, was injured by the fall of a cabinet constructed by de-
fendant, contractor. Recovery was allowed. This decision places
the building contractor and the manufacturer on the same foot-
ing as to liability and brings into application the broad principle
enunciated by Justice Cardozo more than forty years ago -
liability in such cases rests, not solely on privity of contract, but
upon foreseeability of injury to others if the chattel manufac-
tured or the structure erected is not reasonably safe for its in-
tended use.4 The courts of last resort in both California 5 and
New York s have within recent years adopted the same position
expressed by our court in the Strecker decision and the same
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Demerest v. Travelers Insurance Co., 234 La. 1048, 102 So.2d 451 (1958)
(contributory negligence) ; Johnson v. Kennedy, 235 La. 212, 103 So.2d 93 (1958)
(negligence not cause of loss) ; Langlois v. The Continental Insurance Co., 235
La. 153, 103 So.2d 72 (1958) (quantum of damages).
2. 234 La. 522, 100 So.2d 493 (1958).
3. 19 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 221 (1958).
4. McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
PROSSER, THlE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1955) § 84. A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§395 (1934).
5. Hale v. DePaoli, 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1 (1948).
6. Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E. 895
(1957). After this issue of the Review went to press, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida adopted the same position. Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1959) (on
rehearing).
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position was adopted by the Restatement of Torts more than
twenty-five years ago.7 The position has, however, been accepted
only reluctantly by courts in the past.
In view of the fact that under Louisiana law the owner is
under liability to the tenant for defects in the leased structure
we may anticipate that at some time in the future our courts
will face the question as to whether a blameless landowner can
now secure indemnity against a negligent contractor for dam-
ages the owner has been obliged to pay his injured tenant.
Earlier in the same term the Supreme Court imposed liability
on a sewerage contractor for personal injuries and property
damage sustained through his negligence even though the con-
tractor had completed the job and had surrendered the sewer
line to his principal, the town of Jena. The contractor had dam-
aged gas mains in the public street during the construction of
the sewer. As a result, gas escaped into the sewerage conduits,
entered the house of the first plaintiff and caused an explosion
which wholly destroyed the structure and its contents and also
injured the second plaintiff, a plumber who was seeking to de-
termine the source of the escaping gas. Both plaintiffs recov-
ered.8 The court encountered little difficulty in overcoming the
contention of the contractor that his liability ceased when the
line was accepted by the municipality. The court could rely on
the time-honored proposition that a contractor remains liable
for the creation of a public nuisance even after he has completed
his work and surrendered the structure to his principal. In this
connection, the term "public nuisance" is used to describe a con-
dition that threatens the public or other persons outside the
premises on which the work is being done.
Proof of Negligence
A clear and penetrating discussion of res ipsa loquitur by
Chief Justice Fournet is found in Larkin v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co.," handed down during the last term. An
automobile was found resting on its top in a canal adjacent to
the Airline Highway. The bodies of the two drowned persons
were found in the front seat. It was clear from the position of
the bodies that defendant's insured had been the driver. Apart
7. A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 385 (1934).
8. Kendrick v. Mason, 234 La. 271, 99 So.2d 108 (1958) ; King v. Mason, 234
La. 299, 99 So.2d 117 (1958).
9. 233 La. 544, 97 So.2d 389 (1957).
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from this, the only evidence were the tracks of the vehicle.
These indicated that the car had run off the concrete on to the
right hand shoulder and had traveled along that shoulder with
both wheels off the pavement for a distance of one hundred and
eighteen feet. It had then reentered the paved portion of the
highway and at a forty-five degree angle had proceeded to the
opposite side on to the other shoulder where it had flipped over
into the canal. No other evidence was available. Do these facts
indicate negligence of the driver sufficiently to warrant a judg-
ment against the insurer? The Supreme Court decided in the
negative. Although the decision abounds in discussion of those
cryptic Latin words, res ipsa loquitur, the opinion makes clear
its sensible observation that there was only one real problem
involved: do the facts of this controversy suggest negligence of
the insured, rather than some other factors, as the most plausible
explanation of the tragic occurrence?
There is no magical phrase to afford a ready answer, which
must come from the judge's own experience and his personal
judging capacity. Such facts might impress different judges
different ways. The Supreme Court envisioned the possibilities
of an oncoming vehicle that forced the insured on to the shoulder,
or another skidding motorist along side. The court of appeal had
been impressed with the fact that the map made by the tracks
suggested that the ill-fated car had been traveling at a high
speed. One cannot quarrel with the decision either way. The de-
cision was forthright and conspicuously free of the intellectual
balderdash that is so frequently found in cases of this type
throughout the nation. This writer has only one query: the lan-
guage of the opinion suggests at places that the inference of
negligence must be "the only fair and reasonable conclusion"
that can be drawn if liability is to follow. This is not usually
required when a conclusion is to be drawn from circumstantial
evidence in civil controversies. Should it not be enough to im-
pose liability that negligence is the most plausible inference sug-
gested by the facts, even though other remaining inferences are
fair and even reasonable? What was the probable cause? This,
it seems to me, should be the focal point of speculation. Any-
thing more suggests the burden of the state in criminal cases.
But we may honestly doubt that a rephrasing of the formula,
as suggested, would have affected the outcome of the present
controversy. The court was not sufficiently convinced to impose
liability, and that is what really matters.
[Vol. XlX
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The drawing of an inference of negligence or no negligence
from a given fact situation is, and must remain, a highly per-
sonalized matter. The very standard of "reasonable care" does
little more than simply call the judging process into operation.
It demands of the judge that he decide, but it does not tell him
how to make the decision. Here, whether we like it or not, we
must rely upon judgment by men. There is no other way out.
Hence it is not a matter of surprise that the same fact situation
may indicate negligence to one court and the use of "reasonable
care" to another. Ben Devall backed into the driveway of his
friend Edgar Brown in West Baton Rouge Parish to engage
in a short conversation with Brown and his wife. These latter
stood by the side of the car, while a neighbor, Abbott, played
ball with Brown's three children on the adjacent lawn. Devall
then proceeded to move his car forward. It struck and injured
the eighteen-month old Brown infant, who, unobserved, had
crawled out into the driveway. No one saw the child until it was
too late. Could Devall rely on the fact that the parents, who
were in an advantageous position to observe, would warn him
if a child were in danger? Or should he make independent in-
quiry of the parents, or even alight from the vehicle and make
his own search before starting? Was Devall a "reasonable man"?
Is it enough that he did what you and I would probably have
done, or should he have done better? Was it important that
there was an impersonal insurer capable of absorbing the cost
and who was in a position later to raise your insurance rates
and mine to care for such charges? Where is the spark that
lights the flame of judgment in such cases? Is there law for
such situations beyond the authority of the judge to decide and
beyond the compulsion that a decision must be made? Does "rea-
sonable care" mean anything more than that a "reasonable judg-
ment" must be pronounced? The court of appeal applied the
"law" to the facts and it concluded that Devall's insurer must
pay; the Supreme Court applied the "law" to the same facts
and came out with a conclusion that Devall used reasonable
care, and that the insurer was free from liability. 10 The court
of appeal emphasized the "high" care that must be used by
motorists for the protection of children. The Supreme Court
emphasized that Article 2315 of the Civil Code demands that
"fault" be found before liability could follow. It could find no
10. Brown v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 234 La. 860, 101 So.2d 696
(1958).
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"fault." The Supreme Court is a higher court than the court of
appeal, and thus the matter rests.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Assured Clear Distance
In preceding installments of this review of the torts juris-
prudence of Louisiana, the writer has called attention to the fact
that the so-called "range of vision" or "assured clear distance"
rule has consistently proved to be so unworkable and so mani-
festly unfair that courts everywhere have sought to escape its
implications. 1 In Louisiana, like many other jurisdictions, dero-
gation from the rule at first took the form of numerous excep-
tions. As these exceptions grew in scope and number the assured
clear distance rule itself has tended to become assimilated under
the broad formula of negligence. This process of assimilation
was furthered in the recent decision, Suire v. Winters. 2 Plain-
tiff, a motorist, was blinded by the temporary raising of the
headlight beam of an oncoming vehicle. This caused him to crash
into the rear of a truck that was illegally parked by the defend-
ant on the highway without lights. The usual defense of con-
tributory negligence was asserted, but the court refused to sus-
tain the defendant's claim. The significant part of the opinion
reads as follows:
"Although it is the duty of a motorist to have his car under
such control that he can bring his vehicle to a stop within
the range of vision, the standard the law gives us to apply
is that to be expected by a reasonably prudent motorist under
a given set of facts and circumstances then prevailing and
not that exercised by imaginary ideal motorists."''
Last Clear Chance
There has been considerable speculation over the exact im-
port of two of Louisiana's best known decisions on the doctrine
of the last clear chance, Rottman v. Beverly 4 and Jackson v.
Cook.'5 Rottman v. Beverly merely announced for Louisiana
11. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term - Torts
and Workmen's Compensation, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 345, 346-47 (1957);
18 LOuiSIAA LAW Rvmiw 68 (1957).
12. 233 La. 585, 97 So.2d 404 (1957).
13. Id. at 593, 97 So.2d at 406.
14. 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1936).
15. 189 La. 860, 181 So. 195 (1938).
[Vol. X1X338
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the familiar "discovered peril" doctrine that prevails nearly
everywhere: the defendant who sees the plaintiff in a position
of peril and thereafter neglects to take such reasonable steps
as were available to avoid the accident can be subjected to lia-
bility despite the fact that the victim's own negligence "con-
tinued" down to the moment of accident. 16 The "last chance" of
the defendant in such a situation lies in the superiority of his
position in that he saw the situation, while the victim was
merely inadvertent and should have seen. The opinion in Jackson
v. Cook is more enigmatic. Certainly in that case the defendant
motorist did not see the peril of plaintiff, a pedestrian, although
if he had been keeping a proper watchout he would have seen
the peril in time to have avoided the accident. But suppose that
in the Cook case the pedestrian victim also had not been looking
out, but if he had done so he, also, could have avoided the ac-
cident by stepping out of the way at all times when the defend-
ant could have prevented the mishap by looking? Could it still
be said that defendant had a "last chance"? This enigma was
not faced by the court; but the important fact about Cook's case
is that the victim was staggering drunk when he was hit. Un-
doubtedly his venturing out into a public thoroughfare in this
condition was reprehensible and negligent, but the fact remains
that his previous misconduct had rendered him helpless, while
the driver of the car was not helpless, for he had it within his
power to look and see and thus avoid the tragedy. Did the court
in Jackson v. Cook mean to state only that under the facts be-
fore it a recovery was justified? If so, the decision accords with
the conclusions reached generally. 17 Or, did the court in the
Cook case mean that car drivers who do not adjust their conduct
to what they see, or even those who do not look out to see what
they should, must foot the damage bill of those they injure or
kill, irrespective of how careless the victim may have been and
irrespective of the fact that the victim may have had just as
good a chance to save himself as the defendant had to save him?
This is the enigma of Cook.
Recently in McElveen v. Gant 8 the Supreme Court has given
some indication that Cook should be regarded as having virtually
abolished contributory negligence in pedestrian injury cases..
Gant, a cab driver, was not keeping a proper watchout as he
16. A.L.I. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 480 (1934).
17. Id. § 479.
18. 235 La. 17, 102 So.2d 477 (1958).
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approached the intersection of Tulane and South Claiborne Ave-
nues in New Orleans. Mrs. Belshe was crossing the street with-
out looking and she was struck by Gant's taxicab. The Supreme
Court seemed to feel that the fact that Gant was not keeping a
proper watchout and that if he had done so he could have avoided
the accident was enough to make him liable without reference
to the continuing negligence of Mrs. Belshe. If Mrs. Belshe's
situation was one of helplessness, the court did not mention it
and thus it must not have deemed it a matter of much impor-
tance. The decision suggests to this writer that in pedestrian
cases, at least, we have placed the contributory negligence of
the pedestrian on the shelf whenever the alleged carelessness of
the motorist is his failure to make a reasonable adjustment to
the emergency situation before him. Few courts have gone so
far. 9 It would be interesting to speculate whether in this type
of controversy a downward adjustment of damages is being
made by the courts, thus in effect bringing the comparative neg-
ligence principle into operation. If such a surmise should be
correct, would not liability insurers be well advised to proceed
promptly to the legislature and advocate an adoption of com-
parative negligence? This principle, which defendant insurers
once considered their implacable foe, may turn out to be their
best refuge in time of trouble.20
DEFAMATION
The terms, libelous, or, defamatory, are coming to embrace
an increasingly wide variety of statements that may reflect un-
favorably upon a plaintiff. No longer is it necessary that he be
charged with the commission of a crime or with having done
some act involving a lack of moral turpitude. A member of the
community may be libelled if he is charged with manifesting
an attitude that is highly unpopular in the community or with
engaging in conduct that is generally regarded as detrimental
to the best interests of the community, even though the attitude
or conduct charged is in no way immoral or "disgraceful" as
that term is commonly understood. In Fontenot v. Fontenot,21
19. PROSSER, TORTS § 52 (1955). Only in Missouri, under its so-called "hu-
manitarian doctrine" would a recovery be allowed under the circumstances de-
scribed above. Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri, 20 ST. Lotis L.
REV. 113 (1925).
20. Of. Malone, Comparative Negligence - Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 125 (1945).
21. 104 So.2d 431 (La. 1958).
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defendant, in the course of a broadcast, made the following
statement concerning plaintiff:
"Cazan tells you he wants to bring factories here - tex-
tile mills, milk process, feed mills, etc. Why there was one
textile mill that was coming here and about to be started in
Mamou four or five years ago. This same Cazan is respon-
sible for its not coming here. It is his fault that it did not
come."
The court overruled an exception of no cause of action to a




The Supreme Court had occasion again to affirm the well-
settled proposition that an employee whose duties require that
he operate, ride in, or be in the vicinity of the operation of a
motor propelled conveyance of any kind is engaged in a hazard-
ous employment and is covered by the compensation statute even
though he is doing non-hazardous work at the time of the ac-
cident.' In Luce v. New Hotel Monteleone, Inc. 2 claimant, a
supervisor of domestic help in defendant's hotel, was obliged to
travel from floor to floor on an elevator. She was injured while
alighting therefrom. Compensation was properly awarded. It is
perhaps significant that the opinion by Justice Hamiter appears
to emphasize that the employee must be "regularly exposed to
or... frequently brought in contact with the hazardous feature
of the business." The fact that the above-quoted portion is
italicized in the opinion may suggest that perhaps the much-
disputed rule in the Brownfield decision 3 is not yet a dead letter
in Louisiana compensation law.
Although farming, normally a non-hazardous occupation,
may be rendered hazardous through the use of trucks, tractors,
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Byas v. Hotel Bentley, 157 La. 1030, 103 So. 303 (1924). MALONE, Louisi-
ANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 101 (1951).
2. 234 La. 1075, 102 So.2d 461 (1958).
3. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE 129-131,
1101 (1951).
